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, A has two actions available: C1b ··

A. C1b,

, B has two actions available: C1a ··

·. C1a,

, A has two actions available: T x ··

A. T-x,

, B has two actions available: T x A·

A. B. T-x,

, At every node the player involved in the protocol have two actions available: either follow it or not follow it. If at any step they do not follow it, they get back to the initial state, with outcome (0, 0), The joint strategy recommended by the protocol is ? op = ({C1b A· , T x A· }, ({C1a ·B , T x AB })